Psychiatric diagnoses are everywhere-from depression and
anxiety to bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. These labels often sound
scientific, as if they are based on the same kind of medical certainty as
diagnoses like diabetes or pneumonia. But are they?
The short answer is: no. Despite adopting the language and structure of medicine, psychiatric diagnosis is not like medical diagnosis. It doesn’t identify a known disease in the body. It doesn’t rely on lab tests or physical evidence. And it often serves purposes that go far beyond healthcare- including social control, political power, and economic profit.
What Is a Medical Diagnosis?
In general medicine, diagnosis is a process of discovering what disease or condition a person has, based on physical symptoms, medical tests, and biological evidence. For example:
If you have high blood sugar, frequent urination, and a blood test confirms insulin problems, you may be diagnosed with diabetes.
If you have a persistent cough, weight loss, and a lung scan shows a bacterial infection, you may be diagnosed with tuberculosis.
Medical diagnoses are based on known physical causes and help doctors choose treatments that target the underlying disease. They are grounded in biology and supported by scientific evidence.
In psychiatry, a diagnosis is not based on a biological test- because, for psychiatric conditions, no such test exists. Instead, diagnoses like ‘depression’, schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder are based entirely on observations of behaviour and self-reported experiences. These behaviours are then matched against checklists in manuals like the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders).
Here’s the problem: these checklists describe symptoms, but they do not explain their cause. Psychiatric diagnoses are made by grouping together behaviours (e.g., sleeping too much, feeling hopeless, withdrawing socially) and giving the group a label (e.g., depression). But that label simply repeats what was already observed - it doesn’t tell us why it’s happening.
A person hears voices and becomes withdrawn. They may be diagnosed with schizophrenia. But this diagnosis doesn’t reveal a physical problem in the brain or body. It just labels the behaviour, without providing a confirmed medical explanation.
As psychologist Richard Bentall pointed out, this process is tautological- meaning circular. We say someone has schizophrenia because they act a certain way, and we explain their behaviour by saying they have schizophrenia.
So why does psychiatry present its diagnoses as if they were medical?
In the 1970s and 80s, psychiatry faced growing criticism from antipsychiatry thinkers like Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing, who argued that mental illness was often used to control people who didn’t conform to social norms. At the same time, psychiatry was under economic pressure and competition from other professions like psychology and social work.
To protect its authority, psychiatry began to model itself more closely on traditional medicine. This shift became especially clear with the release of DSM-3 in 1980. Influenced by the rise of biological science, DSM-3 abandoned psychoanalytic and sociological ideas and replaced them with medical-style checklists of symptoms.
Psychiatry began to claim that mental disorders were just another type of medical disorder- despite no solid biological evidence for this claim. In fact, early drafts of DSM-3 even stated that “mental disorders are a subset of medical disorders,” though this line was later removed after criticism from psychologists.
Despite decades of research, no consistent physical cause has been identified for psychiatric conditions. Unlike diabetes or cancer, there are no blood tests, brain scans, or lab markers that can reliably diagnose mental illness - aside from rare exceptions like dementia or brain injury.
Yet the medical model continues to dominate, largely because it sounds authoritative and simplifies complex human problems into treatable "disorders." One major reason the medical model of psychiatry persists is the influence of pharmaceutical companies. Once psychiatry adopted disease-like categories, it opened the door to drug treatments marketed as “correcting” these disorders.
Antidepressants, antipsychotics, and mood stabilisers are often promoted as targeting an “underlying chemical imbalance”- a phrase that has never been scientifically proven. As Moncrieff and Cohen (2005) argue, psychiatric drugs don’t reverse a known disease process. Instead, they are psychoactive substances that change how a person feels or behaves- much like alcohol or caffeine.
These drug effects may suppress symptoms, but they do not prove the existence of a disease. Still, the combination of medical-sounding diagnosis and drug treatment creates a powerful image: that we are treating real, identifiable illnesses- even when we aren’t.
Sociologist Jeff Coulter offers a powerful critique of psychiatric diagnosis. He argues that diagnosing mental illness is not a scientific act, but a social and moral judgment. People are usually labelled "mentally ill" when their behaviour violates what society sees as normal or rational. For example:
Someone who refuses to leave their house or engage in school may be diagnosed with depression.
Someone who questions authority or acts erratically might be diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.
Coulter points out that these judgments often come before any psychiatrist is involved. Teachers, family members, or social workers may decide something is “wrong,” and the psychiatrist gives that judgment an official medical label. But the label is not based on a medical discovery - it’s a way of legitimising social concerns and allowing for interventions like medication, therapy, or institutionalisation.
Epistemology: How Do We Know What We Know?
Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge- its nature, origin, and limits. It addresses fundamental questions about how we come to know what we claim to know. Every discipline, including psychology, psychiatry, and counselling, operates with its own epistemological framework.
Merriam-Webster defines epistemology as "the study or theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity."
Two core criteria in scientific methodology are validity and reliability. Validity refers to "the extent to which a concept, conclusion, or measurement is well-founded and corresponds accurately to the real world" (American Psychological Association, 2020). In the context of psychiatric diagnosis, validity means whether a mental disorder classification corresponds to an actual, identifiable disease entity. This doesn't imply that people are not experiencing distress or impairment- rather, it questions whether these experiences are due to a specific, discrete condition.
For example, advocates proposed the inclusion of Complex PTSD (C-PTSD) as a separate diagnosis. However, the American Psychiatric Association rejected it from both DSM-IV and DSM-5, stating it lacked sufficient empirical distinction from other disorders (Herman, 1992; Resick et al., 2012).
Historically, the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) served as the authoritative guide for diagnosing mental disorders in clinical practice and research. However, with the publication of DSM-5 in 2013, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)-the leading federal agency for mental health research in the U.S.- signalled a major shift. NIMH distanced itself from DSM-5, citing its lack of scientific validity and its failure to advance the understanding of mental disorders (Insel, 2013).
Dr. Thomas Insel, then Director of NIMH, stated: "The weakness is its lack of validity... Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure" (Insel, 2013). This indicates that DSM categories are built on subjective interpretations rather than objective biomedical markers. There are no blood tests, brain scans, or genetic profiles that reliably diagnose any DSM-5 disorder.
Dr. Steven E. Hyman, a neuroscientist and former NIMH director, further criticised the DSM: "It is an absolute scientific nightmare... Many patients receive multiple diagnoses, but they don't have five different diseases. Instead, they often suffer from one underlying condition manifesting in complex ways" (Hyman, 2010). He argued that DSM categories are "widely accepted but fictive diagnostic constructs."
In response, NIMH initiated the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project, aiming to shift diagnostic frameworks toward biologically and cognitively grounded dimensions of functioning. This approach seeks to integrate genetic, imaging, and behavioural data to develop more precise and scientifically valid categories (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013).
The academic paper "Are Psychiatric Diagnoses an Obstacle for Research and Practice?" examined the Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) category and concluded: "DSM diagnoses are not useful for research due to their lack of validity. They offer a shared nomenclature, but it may be the wrong one" (Markon, Chmielewski & Miller, 2011).
The Council for Evidence-Based Psychiatry in the UK has argued: "Psychiatric diagnostic manuals such as DSM and ICD are not objective scientific texts, but rather cultural artifacts created through clinical consensus and professional voting. Their scientific credibility and clinical usefulness are highly debatable, yet they continue to shape the medicalisation of human suffering" (Moncrieff et al., 2014).
Unlike diagnoses in physical medicine- where empirical evidence determines disease categories- psychiatric diagnoses are often decided by committee vote. The notion that medical professionals can vote a condition into existence raises serious questions about scientific rigour.
The phrase "medicalisation of human experience" encapsulates this concern. It refers to how everyday struggles, distress, or emotional pain are increasingly framed as medical problems requiring pharmaceutical treatment. For instance, "social anxiety disorder" may pathologise normal human shyness or fear of social judgement- experiences that could also be interpreted through moral or spiritual lenses.
While much attention has been given to the lack of validity in psychiatric diagnosis, the issue of reliability is equally falls short. Reliability refers to the consistency with which a diagnostic category can be applied by different clinicians across time and settings. In scientific disciplines, a diagnosis or measurement tool must yield the same results under consistent conditions to be considered reliable. Numerous studies and reviews have shown that psychiatric diagnoses- including major ones like depression and schizophrenia-fail to meet this basic requirement.
For instance, in the field trials for DSM-5, the reliability of several major diagnoses was alarmingly low. A diagnosis of "major depressive disorder" showed a kappa score of only 0.28- well below the threshold considered acceptable for clinical use (Regier et al., 2013).
This lack of consistency means that two psychiatrists might not agree on a diagnosis for the same person, calling into question the legitimacy of these categories as scientific tools. In medicine, such inconsistency would be unacceptable- imagine if two doctors could not agree on whether a person has diabetes or cancer.
The ICD (International Classification of Diseases), maintained by the World Health Organisation, faces similar criticisms. Although positioned as a more global standard, its psychiatric categories still rely on symptom clusters, and it suffers from the same limitations of subjectivity, cultural bias, and poor inter-rater reliability (Wakefield, 2013).
As Dr. Allen Frances, chair of the DSM-4 task force, has publicly stated, “There is no definition of a mental disorder. It’s bullshit. I mean, you just can’t define it” (Greenberg, 2010). His statement reflects the broader concern that the entire framework of psychiatric categorisation lacks both precision, validity, reliability and agreement among professionals.
So, the mental health industry adopts scientific standards in order to claim legitimacy, yet the very criteria and standards it sets for itself often fail to meet those same scientific benchmarks. As highlighted above, the psychiatric profession has embraced the authority of science to secure its status, but it consistently fails to uphold the scientific principles of validity and reliability.
Islam does not deny science or scientific inquiry. In fact, as many scholars argue, Muslim civilisations historically pioneered advancements in science and technology. If no clear standards are established, then anyone can claim anything-as often happens in psychiatry. But when such claims are made, they must be held accountable to the very standards that psychiatry claims to be based upon. If these standards are not met, then the system must be questioned as speculative, built on unscientific and misleading foundations.
That is why even many psychiatrists and critics argue that modern psychiatry has devolved into scientism- a belief system that uses the language and appearance of science without fulfilling its essential requirements.
A comparison
In Islamic tradition- and in everyday life- people suffer deeply from emotional and moral struggles that affect their thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. These struggles are real and often painful, but we do not see them as brain diseases, nor do we treat them with chemical drugs.
Examples to Understand This Better:
Pride (Kibr): Someone who is proud may look down on others, refuse advice, and always insist on being right. This damages relationships and personal growth. But we don’t say this person has a “chemical imbalance” or prescribe medication to make them humble. Instead, pride is a spiritual or moral problem addressed through self-reflection, advice, prayer, and character development.
Jealousy (Ḥasad): A person consumed by envy may feel bitter or act cruelly, but we don’t label this as a brain disorder or treat it with antidepressants. Jealousy is seen as a test of the heart, with remedies in gratitude, trust in God, and spiritual self-awareness.
Grief and Loss: When someone loses a loved one and feels sad or anxious, this is a natural human response. Modern psychiatry might call this a “disorder” and treat it with medication. Islam, however, offers compassion, prayer, remembrance, and time- not drugs- to heal grief. Even the Prophet ﷺ experienced sorrow, showing that such feelings are part of life, not medical illnesses.
Psychiatry treats natural human emotions and behaviours - sadness, anger, fear, rebellion, or loss - as brain diseases needing medication. This approach:
Ignores the spiritual, moral, and social roots of many human struggles.
Turns normal distress or difficult behaviour into a “disorder.”
Promotes the use of powerful drugs to “treat” what might simply be natural emotions, personal growth challenges, or spiritual imbalances.
Just as we wouldn’t treat guilt with painkillers or arrogance with antibiotics, we shouldn’t quickly use psychiatric drugs for struggles such as:
Attachment to wealth or fame Anger and impatience
Despair and hopelessness
Defiance or disobedience
These are not physical brain defects, but problems of the soul. They require spiritual guidance, reflection, community support, and personal growth, not chemical correction.
Why This Matters
The belief that psychiatric diagnosis is like medical diagnosis is deeply misleading. It hides the subjective, value-laden, and socially constructed nature of psychiatric labels behind a mask of medical objectivity. It encourages us to treat human distress and difference as biological defects - and to respond with drugs, rather than understanding, support, or social change.
This doesn’t mean people don’t suffer, or that help shouldn’t be offered. But we need to recognise that psychiatric diagnosis often serves institutional interests, not individual needs- reinforcing the power of psychiatry, pharmaceutical companies, and social systems that prefer quick fixes over deep engagement.
A. Hasan
The short answer is: no. Despite adopting the language and structure of medicine, psychiatric diagnosis is not like medical diagnosis. It doesn’t identify a known disease in the body. It doesn’t rely on lab tests or physical evidence. And it often serves purposes that go far beyond healthcare- including social control, political power, and economic profit.
What Is a Medical Diagnosis?
In general medicine, diagnosis is a process of discovering what disease or condition a person has, based on physical symptoms, medical tests, and biological evidence. For example:
If you have high blood sugar, frequent urination, and a blood test confirms insulin problems, you may be diagnosed with diabetes.
If you have a persistent cough, weight loss, and a lung scan shows a bacterial infection, you may be diagnosed with tuberculosis.
Medical diagnoses are based on known physical causes and help doctors choose treatments that target the underlying disease. They are grounded in biology and supported by scientific evidence.
In psychiatry, a diagnosis is not based on a biological test- because, for psychiatric conditions, no such test exists. Instead, diagnoses like ‘depression’, schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder are based entirely on observations of behaviour and self-reported experiences. These behaviours are then matched against checklists in manuals like the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders).
Here’s the problem: these checklists describe symptoms, but they do not explain their cause. Psychiatric diagnoses are made by grouping together behaviours (e.g., sleeping too much, feeling hopeless, withdrawing socially) and giving the group a label (e.g., depression). But that label simply repeats what was already observed - it doesn’t tell us why it’s happening.
A person hears voices and becomes withdrawn. They may be diagnosed with schizophrenia. But this diagnosis doesn’t reveal a physical problem in the brain or body. It just labels the behaviour, without providing a confirmed medical explanation.
As psychologist Richard Bentall pointed out, this process is tautological- meaning circular. We say someone has schizophrenia because they act a certain way, and we explain their behaviour by saying they have schizophrenia.
So why does psychiatry present its diagnoses as if they were medical?
In the 1970s and 80s, psychiatry faced growing criticism from antipsychiatry thinkers like Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing, who argued that mental illness was often used to control people who didn’t conform to social norms. At the same time, psychiatry was under economic pressure and competition from other professions like psychology and social work.
To protect its authority, psychiatry began to model itself more closely on traditional medicine. This shift became especially clear with the release of DSM-3 in 1980. Influenced by the rise of biological science, DSM-3 abandoned psychoanalytic and sociological ideas and replaced them with medical-style checklists of symptoms.
Psychiatry began to claim that mental disorders were just another type of medical disorder- despite no solid biological evidence for this claim. In fact, early drafts of DSM-3 even stated that “mental disorders are a subset of medical disorders,” though this line was later removed after criticism from psychologists.
Despite decades of research, no consistent physical cause has been identified for psychiatric conditions. Unlike diabetes or cancer, there are no blood tests, brain scans, or lab markers that can reliably diagnose mental illness - aside from rare exceptions like dementia or brain injury.
Yet the medical model continues to dominate, largely because it sounds authoritative and simplifies complex human problems into treatable "disorders." One major reason the medical model of psychiatry persists is the influence of pharmaceutical companies. Once psychiatry adopted disease-like categories, it opened the door to drug treatments marketed as “correcting” these disorders.
Antidepressants, antipsychotics, and mood stabilisers are often promoted as targeting an “underlying chemical imbalance”- a phrase that has never been scientifically proven. As Moncrieff and Cohen (2005) argue, psychiatric drugs don’t reverse a known disease process. Instead, they are psychoactive substances that change how a person feels or behaves- much like alcohol or caffeine.
These drug effects may suppress symptoms, but they do not prove the existence of a disease. Still, the combination of medical-sounding diagnosis and drug treatment creates a powerful image: that we are treating real, identifiable illnesses- even when we aren’t.
Sociologist Jeff Coulter offers a powerful critique of psychiatric diagnosis. He argues that diagnosing mental illness is not a scientific act, but a social and moral judgment. People are usually labelled "mentally ill" when their behaviour violates what society sees as normal or rational. For example:
Someone who refuses to leave their house or engage in school may be diagnosed with depression.
Someone who questions authority or acts erratically might be diagnosed with a psychotic disorder.
Coulter points out that these judgments often come before any psychiatrist is involved. Teachers, family members, or social workers may decide something is “wrong,” and the psychiatrist gives that judgment an official medical label. But the label is not based on a medical discovery - it’s a way of legitimising social concerns and allowing for interventions like medication, therapy, or institutionalisation.
Epistemology: How Do We Know What We Know?
Epistemology is the philosophical study of knowledge- its nature, origin, and limits. It addresses fundamental questions about how we come to know what we claim to know. Every discipline, including psychology, psychiatry, and counselling, operates with its own epistemological framework.
Merriam-Webster defines epistemology as "the study or theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge especially with reference to its limits and validity."
Two core criteria in scientific methodology are validity and reliability. Validity refers to "the extent to which a concept, conclusion, or measurement is well-founded and corresponds accurately to the real world" (American Psychological Association, 2020). In the context of psychiatric diagnosis, validity means whether a mental disorder classification corresponds to an actual, identifiable disease entity. This doesn't imply that people are not experiencing distress or impairment- rather, it questions whether these experiences are due to a specific, discrete condition.
For example, advocates proposed the inclusion of Complex PTSD (C-PTSD) as a separate diagnosis. However, the American Psychiatric Association rejected it from both DSM-IV and DSM-5, stating it lacked sufficient empirical distinction from other disorders (Herman, 1992; Resick et al., 2012).
Historically, the DSM (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders) served as the authoritative guide for diagnosing mental disorders in clinical practice and research. However, with the publication of DSM-5 in 2013, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH)-the leading federal agency for mental health research in the U.S.- signalled a major shift. NIMH distanced itself from DSM-5, citing its lack of scientific validity and its failure to advance the understanding of mental disorders (Insel, 2013).
Dr. Thomas Insel, then Director of NIMH, stated: "The weakness is its lack of validity... Unlike our definitions of ischemic heart disease, lymphoma, or AIDS, the DSM diagnoses are based on a consensus about clusters of clinical symptoms, not any objective laboratory measure" (Insel, 2013). This indicates that DSM categories are built on subjective interpretations rather than objective biomedical markers. There are no blood tests, brain scans, or genetic profiles that reliably diagnose any DSM-5 disorder.
Dr. Steven E. Hyman, a neuroscientist and former NIMH director, further criticised the DSM: "It is an absolute scientific nightmare... Many patients receive multiple diagnoses, but they don't have five different diseases. Instead, they often suffer from one underlying condition manifesting in complex ways" (Hyman, 2010). He argued that DSM categories are "widely accepted but fictive diagnostic constructs."
In response, NIMH initiated the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) project, aiming to shift diagnostic frameworks toward biologically and cognitively grounded dimensions of functioning. This approach seeks to integrate genetic, imaging, and behavioural data to develop more precise and scientifically valid categories (Cuthbert & Insel, 2013).
The academic paper "Are Psychiatric Diagnoses an Obstacle for Research and Practice?" examined the Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) category and concluded: "DSM diagnoses are not useful for research due to their lack of validity. They offer a shared nomenclature, but it may be the wrong one" (Markon, Chmielewski & Miller, 2011).
The Council for Evidence-Based Psychiatry in the UK has argued: "Psychiatric diagnostic manuals such as DSM and ICD are not objective scientific texts, but rather cultural artifacts created through clinical consensus and professional voting. Their scientific credibility and clinical usefulness are highly debatable, yet they continue to shape the medicalisation of human suffering" (Moncrieff et al., 2014).
Unlike diagnoses in physical medicine- where empirical evidence determines disease categories- psychiatric diagnoses are often decided by committee vote. The notion that medical professionals can vote a condition into existence raises serious questions about scientific rigour.
The phrase "medicalisation of human experience" encapsulates this concern. It refers to how everyday struggles, distress, or emotional pain are increasingly framed as medical problems requiring pharmaceutical treatment. For instance, "social anxiety disorder" may pathologise normal human shyness or fear of social judgement- experiences that could also be interpreted through moral or spiritual lenses.
While much attention has been given to the lack of validity in psychiatric diagnosis, the issue of reliability is equally falls short. Reliability refers to the consistency with which a diagnostic category can be applied by different clinicians across time and settings. In scientific disciplines, a diagnosis or measurement tool must yield the same results under consistent conditions to be considered reliable. Numerous studies and reviews have shown that psychiatric diagnoses- including major ones like depression and schizophrenia-fail to meet this basic requirement.
For instance, in the field trials for DSM-5, the reliability of several major diagnoses was alarmingly low. A diagnosis of "major depressive disorder" showed a kappa score of only 0.28- well below the threshold considered acceptable for clinical use (Regier et al., 2013).
This lack of consistency means that two psychiatrists might not agree on a diagnosis for the same person, calling into question the legitimacy of these categories as scientific tools. In medicine, such inconsistency would be unacceptable- imagine if two doctors could not agree on whether a person has diabetes or cancer.
The ICD (International Classification of Diseases), maintained by the World Health Organisation, faces similar criticisms. Although positioned as a more global standard, its psychiatric categories still rely on symptom clusters, and it suffers from the same limitations of subjectivity, cultural bias, and poor inter-rater reliability (Wakefield, 2013).
As Dr. Allen Frances, chair of the DSM-4 task force, has publicly stated, “There is no definition of a mental disorder. It’s bullshit. I mean, you just can’t define it” (Greenberg, 2010). His statement reflects the broader concern that the entire framework of psychiatric categorisation lacks both precision, validity, reliability and agreement among professionals.
So, the mental health industry adopts scientific standards in order to claim legitimacy, yet the very criteria and standards it sets for itself often fail to meet those same scientific benchmarks. As highlighted above, the psychiatric profession has embraced the authority of science to secure its status, but it consistently fails to uphold the scientific principles of validity and reliability.
Islam does not deny science or scientific inquiry. In fact, as many scholars argue, Muslim civilisations historically pioneered advancements in science and technology. If no clear standards are established, then anyone can claim anything-as often happens in psychiatry. But when such claims are made, they must be held accountable to the very standards that psychiatry claims to be based upon. If these standards are not met, then the system must be questioned as speculative, built on unscientific and misleading foundations.
That is why even many psychiatrists and critics argue that modern psychiatry has devolved into scientism- a belief system that uses the language and appearance of science without fulfilling its essential requirements.
A comparison
In Islamic tradition- and in everyday life- people suffer deeply from emotional and moral struggles that affect their thoughts, feelings, and behaviour. These struggles are real and often painful, but we do not see them as brain diseases, nor do we treat them with chemical drugs.
Examples to Understand This Better:
Pride (Kibr): Someone who is proud may look down on others, refuse advice, and always insist on being right. This damages relationships and personal growth. But we don’t say this person has a “chemical imbalance” or prescribe medication to make them humble. Instead, pride is a spiritual or moral problem addressed through self-reflection, advice, prayer, and character development.
Jealousy (Ḥasad): A person consumed by envy may feel bitter or act cruelly, but we don’t label this as a brain disorder or treat it with antidepressants. Jealousy is seen as a test of the heart, with remedies in gratitude, trust in God, and spiritual self-awareness.
Grief and Loss: When someone loses a loved one and feels sad or anxious, this is a natural human response. Modern psychiatry might call this a “disorder” and treat it with medication. Islam, however, offers compassion, prayer, remembrance, and time- not drugs- to heal grief. Even the Prophet ﷺ experienced sorrow, showing that such feelings are part of life, not medical illnesses.
Psychiatry treats natural human emotions and behaviours - sadness, anger, fear, rebellion, or loss - as brain diseases needing medication. This approach:
Ignores the spiritual, moral, and social roots of many human struggles.
Turns normal distress or difficult behaviour into a “disorder.”
Promotes the use of powerful drugs to “treat” what might simply be natural emotions, personal growth challenges, or spiritual imbalances.
Just as we wouldn’t treat guilt with painkillers or arrogance with antibiotics, we shouldn’t quickly use psychiatric drugs for struggles such as:
Attachment to wealth or fame Anger and impatience
Despair and hopelessness
Defiance or disobedience
These are not physical brain defects, but problems of the soul. They require spiritual guidance, reflection, community support, and personal growth, not chemical correction.
Why This Matters
The belief that psychiatric diagnosis is like medical diagnosis is deeply misleading. It hides the subjective, value-laden, and socially constructed nature of psychiatric labels behind a mask of medical objectivity. It encourages us to treat human distress and difference as biological defects - and to respond with drugs, rather than understanding, support, or social change.
This doesn’t mean people don’t suffer, or that help shouldn’t be offered. But we need to recognise that psychiatric diagnosis often serves institutional interests, not individual needs- reinforcing the power of psychiatry, pharmaceutical companies, and social systems that prefer quick fixes over deep engagement.
A. Hasan
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